Access to Banking Services and Money Transfers by Mexican Immigrants by Cynthia Bansak & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
 
 
Access to Banking Services and 





Cynthia A. Bansak 
 
 











Department of Economics 
Center for Public Economics 
San Diego State University 















San Diego State University 
Department of Economics 





San Diego State University 
Department of Economics 






















We thank Ed Balsdon, David Bjerk, Eric Brunner, Donna Gunther, Richard Fry, Shu Kahn, Sarah 
Senesky, Terra Mckinnish, Steven Raphael, Betsey Stevenson, Madeline Zavodny, and 
participants at the 2004 ASSA and SOLE meetings, as well as attendees at a Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta seminar for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.  This project was 
supported by a Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity grant from San Diego State University.  




Increased access to the U.S. financial system through banks’ recognition of the ‘matrícula 
consular’ identification card may encourage Mexican immigrants to save and transfer more 
money home.  Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, we examine whether immigrants 
with bank accounts in the U.S. between 1970 and 2002 sent more funds to Mexico than their 
unbanked counterparts.  While having a U.S. bank account does not raise monthly remittances by 
Mexican immigrants, it boosts the amount brought back home by more than $6000 per trip.  
These findings suggest that increased usage of banks by immigrants may enhance future flows of 
funds to Mexico. 
 
JEL Codes:  F22, G21, J61, O15 
 
 
    
I. Introduction 
The recognition of the ‘matrícula consular’ as an acceptable alien identification by 
financial institutions has received considerable attention in the media.
1  Mexican consulates 
around the world have issued the matrícula consular since 1871 and its recent acceptance has 
allowed Mexican nationals to more easily enter the financial mainstream regardless of 
immigration status.
2  The Mexican government has advocated its approval and the U.S. Treasury 
currently allows the recognition of the matrícula consular as a means to grant Mexican 
immigrants access to the U.S. banking system.  In addition to providing lower transaction costs, 
U.S. banks may encourage immigrants to save and there may be an overall increase in the flow 
of funds to Mexico.
3  In this paper, we test the hypothesis that access to banks with low-cost 
wiring and money-transfer services helps boost the level of money transfers sent to Mexico by 
Mexican immigrants in the U.S., whether in the form of periodic remittances or money carried 
personally by Mexican immigrants when returning home.  Specifically, we examine (1) trends in 
the use of banking services by Mexican immigrants, (2) determinants of the use of banking 
services, and (3) the implications of access to the U.S. banking system on money transferring 
practices of Mexican immigrants according to their legal status.   
                                                 
1 In July 2002, the U.S. Treasury issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to implement the requirements of section 
326 of the PATRIOT Act.  The rule requires (among other things) that financial institutions develop a Customer 
Identification Program (CIP) that implements procedures to collect identifying information about customers opening 
an account (U.S. Treasury, 2003a, 2003b).  This rule allows financial institutions to accept, in particular, the 
matricula consular, which is often used by undocumented immigrants to open bank accounts (Porter, Wall Street 
Journal September 19, 2003).  Even prior to the acceptance of the matricula consular, however, banks did not need a 
social security number or tax ID for an individual to open a bank account, as long as it was not interest bearing 
(Handlin et al 2002).   
2 To obtain the card, a Mexican national living abroad needs to supply proof of Mexican citizenship (such as a 
certified copy of a birth certificate or another official ID issued by any Mexican or U.S. authority) to a Mexican 
consulate, which will issue a matrícula consular valid for 5 years for approximately $28 (Dinerstein 2003).  As of 
September 2003, the matrícula consular card was accepted by 280 financial institutions, over 1000 local law 
enforcement agencies and more than a dozen state motor vehicle agencies (Porter, Wall Street Journal September 
19, 2003).   
3 The U.S. Treasury along with the international aid community has been interested in finding ways to channel the 
sizable remittance funds to promote economic development in Mexico (Dinerstein, January 2003).    
1 Using data from the Mexican Migration Project from 1970 to 2002, we first document 
trends in the use of U.S. banking services by Mexican immigrants according to their age and 
decade of last visit.  Given the low usage of financial services in Latin American countries, it is 
not surprising that Mexican immigrants, and in particular undocumented immigrants, have a 
relatively low level of interaction with U.S. banks.
4  Nonetheless, it is important to document the 
portion of immigrants who utilize U.S. banking services since increasing access to banking 
services by Mexican immigrants can potentially affect the volume of money transfers by 
lowering the cost of sending money and by helping immigrants save. 
In the second part of the paper, we look at the linkages between banking, remittances, and 
lump sums brought back home by Mexican immigrants.  According to the U.S. State Department 
and the Central Bank of Mexico, remittances by Mexican nationals to relatives and friends were 
approximately $10 billion in 2002, or roughly 1.7 percent of Mexico’s GNP.  Mexican 
immigrants without bank accounts often rely on money-wiring agencies that charge more than 10 
percent to transfer funds, while banks charge considerably less.
5  This suggests that, without 
banks, Mexican families may spend about $1 billion per year to send their remittances.  Hence, 
through their lower transaction costs, improved access to banking services could potentially 
increase the amount remitted by Mexican immigrants to their home communities.  In addition to 
reducing transaction costs, U.S. banks may encourage Mexican immigrants to save and, 
potentially, remit more to Mexico.  After addressing the potential endogeneity of being banked 
(having a U.S. bank account) and the fact that a sizable number of immigrants choose not to send 
money home, we test whether usage of U.S. banking services is associated with differential 
levels of transfers to Mexico, with a special focus on immigrant legal status. 
                                                 
4 Due in part to a lack of deposit insurance, currency devaluations and bank failures, only about 5-30 percent of 
households in Latin America holds a basic checking account (Inter-American Development Bank 2002).   
2    Our analysis sheds light on the potential effects of the matrícula and other identification 
cards in increasing access to banks on immigrants’ remittance flows and on the lump sums they 
take back to their families and communities at the end of their migration spells.  In particular, we 
find that banking among Mexican immigrants in our sample is limited.  Overall, only 9 percent 
of our sample had a bank account while living in the U.S. on his/her latest trip.  Undocumented 
immigrants are significantly less likely to be banked, whereas immigrants who speak English, 
earn more, stay for longer periods of time in the U.S., and bring their spouses along with them to 
the U.S. are significantly more likely to be banked.  Additionally, institutional and community of 
origin characteristics seem to play a significant role in the use of banking services by Mexican 
immigrants, suggesting that the availability of a banking infrastructure back home and 
immigrants’ familiarity with the banking system play an important role in immigrants’ decision 
to be banked while in the U.S.   
  Finally, access to banking appears to have different consequences on the dollar amount 
remitted on a periodic basis compared to the lump sum immigrants bring back home at the end of 
their migration spells, with these results varying by immigrants’ legal status.  While banking 
does not appear to significantly raise monthly remittance flows by Mexican migrants eventually 
returning to Mexico – whether temporarily or permanently, it helps boost the amount they bring 
back home.  Whereas banked legal immigrants brought back about $2000 more than unbanked 
legal immigrants, the differential was over $6000 for banked undocumented immigrants relative 
to unbanked undocumented immigrants.
6   
Our paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the importance of immigrant 
banking and money transfers and briefly reviews the literature on this subject.  In Section III, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 For example, the Latino Community Credit Union in Durham, N.C. charges only $10 to wire $1000 (Perez 2003).  
 
3  describe our dataset derived from the Mexican Migration Project survey.  Trends in banking, 
saving, and remitting among Mexican immigrants are documented in Section IV.  The 
descriptive analysis motivates our theoretical framework, explained in Section V, as well as our 
empirical methodology in Section VI of the paper.  We discuss the results of our money transfer 
models in Section VII, placing special emphasis on immigrants’ money transfer practices 
according to their legal status.  Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper. 
 
II.  Importance of Banking Access by Immigrants and Review of the Literature 
 
Given the extent of Mexican migration (legal and undocumented) to the U.S.,
7 learning 
about the use of banking services by Mexican immigrants and the implications of access to U.S. 
banks on money transferring practices has become increasingly important for various reasons.  
First, bringing the ‘unbanked’ into the U.S. banking system allows for a more efficient regulation 
of currency in the U.S. and, in the case of undocumented immigrants, lets the government know 
about the number of undocumented immigrants and their financial activities.  Hence, there is a 
need to first, and foremost, learn about the extent of the ‘unbanked’ population among legal and 
undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
Secondly, and as pointed out earlier, immigrants’ access to the U.S. banking system may 
increase the flow of funds remitted to Mexico by helping immigrants save and by lowering the 
cost of wiring and transferring money back home.  Assessing whether this is the case is of 
interest given the uses of remittances back in Mexico.  Remittances are often sent to meet a 
variety of needs from non-migrating family members back in Mexico, such as food, rent, health 
and educational expenses (Brown and Ahlburg 1999, Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003).  In 
addition, remittances often serve an economic development purpose by financing the purchase of 
4  productive assets in home communities, such as land and businesses (Durand et al. 1996, Belo 
2001, Woodruff and Zenteno 2001).  As a result, policymakers have promoted lower cost 
methods of money transfers given the importance of these remittances for economic 
development.
8  Despite the increasingly competitive market for money transfer services (Lowell 
and de la Garza 2002, Handlin et al. 2002), the costs of remittances can vary widely by type of 
method with banks offering a low cost alternative for money transfers (Orozco 2002).  Therefore, 
integrating the unbanked remitters into the mainstream financial system may have a significant 
impact on remittances. 
Third, immigrants who previously relied heavily on informal remitting methods are now 
able to access banking services that provide a safer transmission method (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, forthcoming).  Bank accounts do not require immigrants to carry large sums of cash 
(immigrants carrying large sums of cash are often victims of crimes) and guarantee a safe 
transfer of funds to their families back home, possibly motivating some Mexican immigrants to 
remit more to their families.    
Finally, learning about immigrants’ banking use is particularly important given banks’ 
ability to engage in financial intermediation.  Through their capacity to take deposits, banks not 
only raise immigrants’ ability to save, but increase the likelihood that immigrants’ savings are 
channeled into productive investments.  In addition, banks may be able to alleviate credit 
constraints through credit cards, mortgages, and other loans.  In this respect, the role played by 
                                                                                                                                                             
7As of March 2000, there were an estimated 8.39 million Mexican-born persons living in the U.S., of whom 
approximately 3.9 million were unauthorized (Bean et al. 2001).    
8 For example, the IADB supports increasing the level of remittances to underdeveloped countries by reducing the 
cost of transfers given that remittance flows to Latin America are substantially higher than the total of official 
development assistance to the region (Handlin et al 2002).  Specifically, the IADB suggests that costs can be 
decreased by increasing competition among providers of money transfer services and promoting the use of formal 
financial systems, thereby decreasing the cost of sending remittances.  The latter is analyzed in this paper.   
5  financial intermediation on economic development cannot be overstated and, consequently, it 
appears beneficial to enhance immigrants’ accessibility to the banking system.   
Despite the importance of remittances for numerous receiving countries, there has been 
little research on the transmission mechanism of remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 
forthcoming), and, to our knowledge, no one has examined directly the relationship between 
banks and the level of remittances.
9  The possible lack of research on the effect of banking on the 
level of remittances may be due to the relatively low use of banks by those who remit.
10  
Alternatively, it may be due to the fact that few datasets include detailed information about 
Mexican immigrants, their legal status, their banking usage, and level of money transfers.   
Given the lack of research on banking and remittances, we examine (1) trends in the use 
of banking services by Mexican immigrants, (2) determinants of their use of banking services, 
and (3) the implications of access to the U.S. banking system on their money transferring 
practices according to their legal status.   
 
III. Data  
In order to carry out the study, we use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP).  
The MMP database is the result of a multidisciplinary study of Mexican migration to the U.S.  
Currently, the MMP database includes detailed social, demographic, and economic information 
                                                 
9 In their paper, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (forthcoming) explore the choice of transmission mechanism and find 
that undocumented immigrants are less likely to use banking services.  In contrast, more educated and more skilled 
immigrants are more likely to use U.S. banks for repatriating earnings.   
10 Researchers have identified several difficulties in promoting formal financial systems as a method of remittance 
transmission.  First, the recipients of remittances are often reluctant to deal with banks in Latin America as the 
banking system is seen as corrupt (Handlin et al 2002).  Second, there is confusion over the proper documents 
needed to open an account.  Contrary to widespread belief, banks do not need a social security number or tax ID for 
an individual to open a bank account, as long as it is not interest bearing (Handlin et al 2002).  In addition, more 
recently Mexican migrants can use the matrícula consular as a valid form of identification to open an account at 
numerous financial institutions.   
6  from approximately 16,000 households in 93 representative communities in 17 Mexican states.
11  
The MMP survey has been carried out annually in the winter months of 1982-1983 and 1987-
2002.
12  Two to five Mexican communities are surveyed each year and a sample of 
approximately 200 households is randomly selected in each community.  For each household, a 
complete life history is gathered for the household head which includes detailed information on 
past migration experiences in the United States.  After gathering detailed information on these 
households, interviewers travel to the destination areas in the U.S. to administer identical 
questionnaires to households from the same communities in Mexico who have settled in the U.S. 
and no longer return home.  Altogether, the MMP provides reasonably representative data on 
authorized and unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S.  (Massey and Zenteno 2000, 
Munshi 2003).   
The MMP is one of the richest datasets available for studying Mexican migration to the 
U.S. and contains important information on immigrants banking and remittance behavior in 
addition to legal status at the time of migration.  For the purpose of this study, we use the 
information collected from approximately 3,000 migrating household heads who are interviewed 
upon their return to Mexico.  We choose this sample due to the fact that a large share of Mexican 
immigrants, particularly those who remit, return to Mexico  (Lowell 1992, Lindstrom 1996, 
Reyes 1997, Orrenius 1999).  In addition, the sample design of the MMP is such that return 
migrants interviewed in Mexico are intended to be a representative group of such immigrants.
13  
                                                 
11 As of the MMP93, the sample covers communities in the states of Aguascalientes, Baja California Norte, 
Chihuahua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. 
12 The MMP interviews were conducted in communities of various size, ethnic composition, and economic 
development that are typical source regions for US bound migrants.  In addition, the sample expands over time to 
incorporate communities in newer sending states. 
13 For further information regarding the methodology and survey design of the MMP93, see 
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/databases/studydesign-en.aspx 
7  Lastly, in an effort to minimize recall bias and ensure greater accuracy of responses, we further 
restrict our sample to those whose last trip to the U.S. occurred since 1970.
14
The following three variables constitute the primary focus of our analysis: 1) the funds 
remitted each month to families back in Mexico, 2) the lump sum taken back home to Mexico, 
and 3) the ownership of a bank account during an immigrant’s most recent trip to the U.S.  In 
addition, we account for a variety of personal and household characteristics affecting remitting 
behavior, regardless of whether it takes place periodically (monthly remittances) or at the end of 
their migration experience (a lump sum brought back to Mexico).  Some of these characteristics 
include immigrants’ personal characteristics (age and gender), immigrants’ ability to save and 
remit money home (as captured by their educational attainment, ability to speak English, 
monthly earnings, and time in the U.S.), and the economic needs of family members back home 
(as captured by whether the presence of a spouse and the percent of household members of non-
working age in Mexico).
15   
Finally, we construct variables on immigrants’ community of origin and their state of 
residency while in the U.S.  We use this information to assess the role that regional development, 
the existence of a banking network, and the banking culture, among other factors, might play in 
their banking, saving, and remitting behavior while in the U.S.  A detailed description of the 
variables used in our analysis, as well as their means and standard deviations, are included in 
Table A in the appendix.   
An average of 76 percent of immigrants remitted approximately $190 home on a monthly 
basis.  In addition to these monthly remittance payments, about 73 percent of immigrants in our 
                                                 
14 Given that the survey has been conducted since 1982, it is not surprising that migrants’ most recent trips have 
largely been taken over the past thirty years.  According to the authors’ calculations, approximately eighty percent of 
those in the MMP93 sample who migrated to the U.S. did so between 1970 and 2002. 
8  sample saved and took some money with them back to Mexico at the end of their last U.S. trip.  
The average amount being brought home equaled $1129.  Immigrants’ limited banking use may 
have affected their overall-remitting behavior.  Only 9 percent of our sample had a bank account 
during their last U.S. trip.  This low percentage may be, in part, due to immigrants’ 
undocumented status.  Only 32 percent of immigrants in the MMP were documented during their 
last U.S. trip.  Other interesting demographic characteristics include gender, age and human 
capital.  Ninety-five percent of our sample is male.  On average, immigrants in the sample were 
43 years old when they last migrated to the U.S., and possessed limited human capital.  Average 
educational attainment is 5 years of schooling and only 24 percent of immigrants spoke English 
during their last U.S. trip.  Additionally, the vast majority of our sample (94 percent) worked 
while in the U.S., with 84 percent leaving their spouses behind with a family comprised of 
mostly non-working age dependents (65 percent).  The average trip duration was 2 years.  In 
what follows, we examine Mexican immigrants’ banking trends and remitting patterns.     
 
IV.  Banking Trends, Saving, and Remitting Behavior of Mexican Immigrants 
To motivate our analysis, we first provide descriptive evidence of trends in the use of 
banking services by Mexican immigrants.  Subsequently, we examine monthly remittances and 
lump sum transfers by immigrants’ banking status.  
Trends in the Use of Banking Services 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the share of Mexican immigrants with bank accounts 
while living in the U.S. has been limited but is increasing over time.  As can be seen in Table 1, 
only 9 percent of our sample of Mexican migrant household heads had a bank account during 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Most of the variables for the study came from the MMP93 Migration, Community and Household files.  These 
datasets and more information on the Mexican Migration Project can be found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu 
9  their most recent trip to the U.S.  However, the use of banking services has increased steadily 
during the past several decades from three percent (as a share of immigrants) in the 1970s to 8-
1/2 percent in the 1980s, and to almost 10 percent in the 1990s.  To address potential cohort 
effects, Table 1 also details the bank use by age groups within any given arrival decade.  
Nonetheless, the pattern of increased banking usage can still be observed over time.     
Remittances and Lump Sum Transfers by Banking Status
To assess the general patterns of transfers by immigrants to their families in Mexico, we 
present the average remittances and lump sum transfers by banking status.  We distinguish 
between remittances repatriated while in the U.S. (which we call “monthly remittances”) and 
lump sums brought back to Mexico (which we call “one-time lump sums brought back home”).   
For our sample of Mexican immigrants, average remittances are larger among the banked 
than the unbanked, but this difference is not statistically significant.  When conditioning on 
remitting (e.g. remittances > 0), banked return migrants remit $84 more per month than 
unbanked return migrants.  Turning to the lump sums brought back to Mexico, banked return 
migrants bring back significantly more than their unbanked counterparts.  The difference 
between the banked and unbanked is about $2400 and over $4400 when conditioning on the 
amount brought back to back to Mexico being nonzero.  Thus, there is evidence that, among 
returnees, banked immigrants transfer more money back to Mexico than unbanked immigrants.   
Overall, these figures, while solely differences in means by banking status, motivate the 
need to consider immigrants’ banking access as a primary determinant in their money 
transferring patterns.     
 
10   V. Theoretical  Framework 
Our goal is to empirically examine whether access to banking is associated with a higher 
volume of immigrants’ monthly remittances and/or a larger one-time lump sum brought back 
home by immigrants at the end of the migration spell.  To illustrate the various ways in which 
access to banking may affect immigrants’ periodic remittances as well as one time transfers, we 
use a simple two-period model in which immigrants altruistically care for their families.  
Specifically, we assume that immigrants’ utility depends on their leisure and consumption of a 
purchased market good, as well as on their families’ consumption of goods and leisure.
16  Hence, 
immigrants’ objective function can be described as the sum of their utilities in each period, with 
δ representing their discount rate as follows:   
(1) Max    V=        ) , ; , ( ) , ; , (
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
f i f i f i f i l l c c U l l c c U δ +
 
The vectors   and  stand for immigrants’ consumption and leisure, whereas   and 
represent the consumption and leisure choices of immigrants’ families.  The utility function 
has the standard general properties, i.e. increasing in each argument, with negative second partial 
derivatives.  Immigrants maximize this objective function subject to budget and time constraints 
in each period.  In period 1, immigrants choose whether to remit money to their families back 
home ( ) so as to contribute to their consumption of goods and leisure.  For simplicity, we 
assume that credit constraints prevent immigrants from transferring resources from the second to 
the first period via borrowing.  However, saving ( ) is possible.  In period 2, the principal plus 
its return (i.e.  ) may be used for consumption or, if not utilized, it may be taken back 




i s r * ) 1 ( +
                                                 
16 This is one of the ways in which altruism can be modeled.  That is, migrants may be assumed to care about their 
families’ consumption of goods and services, independently of their families’ preferences (Chiuri 2000).  This form 
of altruism is called ‘paternalism’.  Other models of altruism consider that individuals derive utility from their 
11   home as a lump sum ( ). i LS
17  Finally, immigrants are endowed with T units of time in each 
period that they can use for leisure or work, with  representing their ongoing market wage.  
Therefore, normalizing the price of purchased market goods to 1, we can write immigrants’ 
constraints as: 
w
(2)   in period 1, and  ) ( *
1 1 1
i i i r i l T w s R p c − = + +
(3)  in period 2,   i i i i s r l T w LS c * ) 1 ( ) ( *
2 2 + + − = +
with:   and  .  ) ( i b r r = () i r r b p p =
The price of remitting funds to Mexico, including wiring fees, bank charges, time taken 
to remit money home, and risk of being a victim of theft if carrying large sums of cash, is 
captured by  .  The price of remitting funds to Mexico ( ) as well as immigrants’ savings 
( ) are likely to be affected by whether or not immigrants have access to the U.S. banking 
system ( ).  For instance, banking access may: (a) lower the cost of remitting funds to Mexico, 
and/or (b) provide immigrants with access to a variety of savings and investment instruments that 
may result in greater wealth accumulation,
r p r p
i s
i b
18 possibly affecting immigrants’ periodic remitting 
patterns as well as the amounts they take back home at the end of their migration spells.  
Specifically, the problem described above suggests the following reduced form expressions for 
immigrants’ periodic and one-time transfers to their families:  
(4)   and  .    ) , ), ( ), ( (
* w b r b p f R i i r i δ = ) , ), ( ), ( (
* w b r b p g LS i i r i δ =
                                                                                                                                                             
families’ utilities, even if their consumption of goods and services is not what the individuals might have desired for 
them.  This alternative form of altruism is called ‘caring’ (Becker 1981).    
17 We assume that migrants only remit during the first period to allow for a higher discounting of the lump sums 
taken back home by migrants at the end of their migration experience relative to monies sent on a periodic basis to 
their families.   
18 While neoclassical theory does not predict that an increase in access to an interest-bearing financial instrument 
will necessarily lead to increased savings, the possibility exists that increases in access, information, and facilitation 

















both of which are, a priori, ambiguous.  For instance, focusing on immigrants’ periodic remitting 
patterns, the possibility exists that access to banking lowers the cost of remitting funds to Mexico 







).  In that event, there would be an income effect predicting that immigrants (now 
enjoying a larger disposable income) will remit more money to their families.  Furthermore, 
there would be a substitution effect suggesting a substitution away from consumption towards 
remitting due to the lower cost of remitting funds to Mexico; therefore enhancing the 
















.   
However, access to banking may not only lower the cost of remitting, but also increase 





).  Once more, we would have an income effect 
predicting an increase in immigrants’ remittances following their augmented disposable incomes.  
Nonetheless, the higher return to immigrants’ savings would also raise the opportunity cost of 
remitting money on a periodic basis, pushing immigrants towards saving and taking back home 
the principal plus the accumulated return at the end of the migration spell.  This negative 
substitution effect may be particularly strong among Mexican immigrants who go back home on 
a frequent basis and who, consequently, may be able to wait to bring their accumulated savings 
to their families back home with them upon their return.  Therefore, it is unclear whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
increase savings among immigrants as was found in the case of IDAs (individual deposit accounts) for the poor 
(Sherranden et al. 2003).   























i ).   
By the same token, without further assumptions, it is unclear whether immigrants’ access 
to banking will raise or reduce the lump sum they bring back home at the end of their migration 
spells.  Given the potential ambiguity in the signs of the effects of banking on immigrants’ 
monthly remittances and one-time lump sum transfers to their families, we empirically assess 
their signs in the following sections. 
 
VI. Empirical  Methodology 
Before examining the impact that banking may have on our sample of Mexican 
immigrants, it is worth noting that our inferences about the effect of banking on money transfers 
to Mexico are derived from the group Mexican immigrants who return to Mexico at some point 
in their lives, whether temporarily or permanently.  As noted by others in the literature (Gubert 
2002), this could be an issue if our intent were to make inferences about the effect of banking on 
the money transfers of the overall Mexican population.  However, to the extent that we are 
interested in learning about the impact of access to banking on Mexican immigrants, modeling 
the migration decision is not crucial.  Moreover, since returnees are the ones most likely to 
engage in transferring money back to Mexico and, furthermore, constitute the vast majority of 
Mexican immigrants to the U.S. due to the proximity between the two countries, focusing on this 
population should provide us with useful insights about the potential effect of banking on money 
transfers from Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (Lowell 1992, Lindstrom 1996, Reyes 1997, 
Orrenius 1999). 
14   Given that a large share of immigrants in our sample (approximately 25 percent) do not 
send money home, we propose the following Tobit model for estimating the effects of banking 
( ) on Mexican immigrants’ money transfers to their families (denoted by  b T ) – whether these 
refer to monthly payments (R ) or to the lump sum brought back home at the end of the 
migratory experience ( ):  LS




ifc X b T ε φ β + + =




ifc ifc T T =  if  ,  0 T
*
ifc >
and where:  , i=migrating household head,  f=family in Mexico, and 
c=community in Mexico.  In addition to immigrants’ access to banking ( ), the model in 
equation (5) accounts for a variety of immigrants’ personal, family, and community of origin 
characteristics (included in vector   and discussed below) possibly affecting their remittances 
as well as lump sum payments taken back home at the end of their migration spells. 





However, a couple of issues regarding the model in equation (5) are worth noting at this 
point in the paper.  First, as noted in equation (5), some of the values for our dependent variable 
are observed (i.e. those cases in which Mexican immigrants remitted or took money back home), 
whereas the remaining values (i.e. those instances in which Mexican immigrants do not remit nor 
take money back home) are censored or unobserved.  When some of the data are censored, the 
distribution that applies to the sample data is a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions, 
rendering the use of OLS inappropriate.   
Two general types of estimation methods are typically used under such circumstances.  
One of them is a two-part selection model, where the likelihood to remit or bring money back 
15   home is first modeled using a probit model and the second stage is estimated by OLS and uses 
the predicted values from the first stage probit to correct for the ongoing selection.  The 
advantage of the two-part selection model is that its allows for the regressors to have a different 
effect on the likelihood of transferring money versus on the dollar amount finally remitted or 
brought back home.  The major disadvantage is that the results tend to be quite sensitive to the 
identification exclusions, which are often disputable given the difficulty of finding factors that 
affect the decision to remit or bring money back home, but do not influence the dollar amount 
transferred home by the immigrant.   
An alternative often used when modeling immigrants’ money transferring practices is the 
Tobit model (Brown 1997, Ravallion and Dearden 1998, Schrieder and Knerr 2000).  The Tobit 
takes into account the diverse nature of the distribution of immigrants’ money transfers by 
modeling the likelihood of remitting or bringing money back home and the dollar amount finally 
transferred as a function of the same covariates.  A potential disadvantage of the Tobit model is 
that a change in any regressor will have the same effect (same sign) on both the probability of 
remitting or bringing money back home and on the dollar amount finally transferred home.
19  
Nonetheless, recognizing: (a) the difficulty of conceiving appropriate identifiers that affect the 
decision to remit or bring money back home without influencing the dollar amount transferred 
home by the immigrant, and (b) the sensitivity of the findings to the choice of identifiers, we 
estimate equation (5) using a Tobit model.   
Second, the possibility exists that immigrants’ banking status in equation (5) is 
endogenous to their money transferring behavior.  The endogeneity of immigrants’ banking 
                                                 
19 A second potential disadvantage of the Tobit and two-part selection models is their reliance on normality and 
homoscedasticity in the latent variables.  However, as noted by Wooldridge (2003), neither conditional normality 
nor heteroskedasticity affect the unbiasedness or consistency of the OLS estimates and, as a result, for reasonable 
deviations from these assumptions, the Tobit model still provides good estimates.  
16   status may be originating from various sources.  First, omitted variables affecting Mexican 
immigrants’ money transferring practices, such as precise information on their wealth, may be 
correlated with immigrants’ banking status in the U.S.  As a result, our estimates of the effect of 
banking on immigrants’ money transferring practices are likely to be biased.  A second source of 
endogeneity of banking is its potential simultaneity of banking with remitting as well as with 
saving (to bring money back home).  Mexican immigrants planning to remit or bring money back 
home may choose to become banked during their stay in the U.S. given the advantages of 
remitting through banks, such as greater safety and lower transferring costs, and the saving and 
wealth accumulation process often facilitated through banking.   
To take into account the potential endogeneity of immigrants’ banking status, we rely on 
the method of instrumental variables and estimate the predicted probability of being banked 
using the following probit model: 
(6)  , where:   and  ifc
'
ifc ifc ifc u ) Z ( ) Z | 1 b ( + = = γ Φ P ) 1 , 0 ( ~ Z | u ifc ifc N
where the vector   includes immigrants’ personal, family, and community of origin 
characteristics in vector  .  Additionally, the vector  includes information on other factors 
possibly affecting immigrants’ accessibility to banks, such as whether immigrants had a bank in 
their hometown before migrating to the U.S., as well as two sets of dummy variables indicating 
their states of origin in Mexico as well as of the state in the U.S. where they resided during their 
last U.S. trip.  These dummy variables are chosen to account for differences in the institutional 
and economic environment in which immigrants operate, both at home in Mexico as well as in 
the U.S., as typified by the banks’ outreach efforts to the unbanked, banking fees, and any bank 
related use taxes, among many others.   
ifc Z
ifc X ifc Z
17   To help identify equation (6), information on whether there was a bank in immigrants’ 
communities before they migrated and the two sets of dummies indicative of immigrants’ state of 
origin and state of residence while in the U.S. is excluded from equation (5).  These variables are 
chosen as factors that likely affect immigrants’ money transfers only through their effect on the 
probability of having a bank account in the U.S., which we account for when modeling migrants’ 
money transfer practices through their predicted probability of being banked.  The intuition 
behind our choice of our instruments is as follows.  Having a bank in the home community 
before migrating to the U.S. raises the migrant’s familiarity with the banking system and 
increases the likelihood of opening a bank account in the U.S.  Having a bank account in the U.S. 
will then increase both the probability of accumulating more wealth and the likelihood that 
immigrants will use banks to remit money back home.  In addition, being banked may also raise 
the dollar amount sent back or brought back to Mexico given the lower cost of remitting money 
through banks and the ongoing accumulation of savings in U.S. banks. 
Something similar can be said with respect to the use of dummies indicative of 
immigrants’ state of origin as instruments.  However, these may also be indicative of potential 
regional differences in income, wealth, and other characteristics possibly influencing 
immigrants’ money transferring practices (as well as their likelihood of being banked).  
Therefore, we exclude them from our final model of migrants’ money transfer practices, which, 
instead, includes measures of the standard of living (a proxy for the economic development) of 
immigrants’ states of origin in Mexico in order to address these possible regional differences.
20  
                                                 
20 As further justification for their exclusion in equation (6), the variables chosen as instruments proved to be 
statistically non-significant in the Tobit analyses.  Nonetheless, given the potential sensitivity of instrumental 
variable regression analysis to the variables chosen as instruments of the endogenous regressors, we carry out the 
analysis with and without instrumenting for migrants’ banking use while in the U.S. to assess the robustness of our 
results to the various specifications.  
18   After estimating the probit model specified in equation (6), we then estimate the 
following Tobit model: 




ifc X P T ε φ β + + = ( )
*
ifc ifc T , 0 max T =  and  ) , 0 ( ~ X , P |
2
ifc Banked ifc σ ε N 
where   represents immigrants’ predicted probability of having a bank account during their 
last trip to the U.S.
Banked P
21  As noted earlier, the goal of our empirical work is to estimate the effect of 
banking on the amount transferred back home.  The overall banking effect results from both 
banks being able to offer lower price remitting services ( ( ) b pr ) and through banks role in the 
facilitation of the accumulation of savings ( ( ) b s ).  Under such circumstances, the use of banking 
services may affect both periodic remitting patterns and the accumulated savings brought back 
home by immigrants upon their return to their origin communities.     
What other factors may affect immigrants’ remittances and their one-time transfers at the 
close of their migration experiences?  We consider a variety of immigrants’ personal, family, and 
community of origin characteristics contained in the vector  .  For instance, immigrants’ 
money transfers are likely to depend on their income and ability to send funds abroad –as 
proxied by  in our reduced form expressions (equation (4)).  As a proxy for income, we include 
monthly earnings while in the U.S., educational attainment, and ability to speak English.  To 
capture immigrants’ ability to send money to their families, we include information on their legal 
status while in the U.S.  Undocumented immigrants might encounter greater difficulties in 
finding employment than their legal counterparts and, even when employed, they are subject to a 
greater economic uncertainty than legal immigrants.  Hence, they might experience greater 
difficulty in remitting or taking a lump sum back home than their documented counterparts.   
ifc X
w
                                                 
21 Standard errors of the estimates are computed using the bootstrap procedure suggested by Hall and Wilson (1991).   
19   Immigrants’ remitting patterns and their decision to take money back home is also likely 
to be affected by their families’ income back home.  We use two variables to capture economic 
need as a proxy for immigrants’ family income back in Mexico.  First, we introduce a 
dichotomous variable indicative of whether an immigrant’s spouse stayed back in Mexico.  
Secondly, we control for the percent of non-working age family members left back home as a 
measure of economic dependence.  For both variables, we expect to find a positive relationship 
with the likelihood and the dollar amount remitted or taken back home by the migrant in the U.S. 
Finally, we include a variety of demographic, migratory and community characteristics 
possibly affecting immigrants’ money transferring behavior.  Gender and age are important 
demographic controls since men of working age are still more likely to be the main breadwinners 
in immigrants’ families, making them more likely to remit and remit larger sums of money back 
home than, for example, female immigrants of non-working age.  Additionally, we account for 
the duration of immigrants’ trip to the U.S. to address the potential remittance decay that takes 
place as immigrants become more assimilated to and settled in the host country.  Lastly, a variety 
of community characteristics likely to affect immigrants’ money transfers to their families are 
also included in the analysis.  These characteristics include the number of factories in 
immigrants’ communities of origin as well as two dichotomous variables indicative of the 
standard of living in immigrants’ state of origin.  The number of factories captures the rural 
versus urban nature of immigrants’ origin communities.  In turn, the dummy variables indicative 
of the standard of living in immigrants’ state of origin allow us to control for unobserved 
income, wealth, and other macroeconomic characteristics immigrants’ origin communities, 
which may be influencing immigrants’ money transferring practices.   
 
20   VII.  Mexican Immigrant’s Remitting Behavior  
 
  Tables 3 and 4 display the results from estimating Tobit models of the dollar amount 
repatriated by Mexican immigrants, whether monthly or as a lump-sum payment at the end of 
their last U.S. migration.  The models are estimated both with and without instrumenting for 
immigrants’ banked status while in the U.S.  The instrumental variable results make use of the 
predicted probability of being banked derived from a probit model estimating the likelihood of 
having a bank account during their last U.S. trip.  According to the probit estimates in Appendix 
Table B, undocumented immigrants are approximately 7.6 percentage points less likely to be 
banked than their legal counterparts.  Similarly, Mexican immigrants who migrate leaving their 
spouses behind appear to be 3 percentage points less likely to be banked than those who did not 
(e.g. their single counterparts and their married counterparts who bring their spouses to the U.S.).  
This result may be simply signaling these immigrants’ intent to return back to Mexico in the near 
future and their lack of interest in familiarizing themselves with the U.S. banking system.  In 
contrast, Mexican immigrants who speak English, enjoy higher monthly earnings, and stay 
longer periods of time in the U.S. are significantly more likely to be banked.     
  Additionally, institutional and community of origin characteristics seem to play a 
significant role on the use of banking by Mexican immigrants.  In particular, the likelihood of 
being banked is 3 percentage points lower among Mexican immigrants originating in some of the 
Mexican states with the poorer standards of living.  In our sample, these are the states of 
Campeche, Tabasco, Veracruz, Puebla, Hidalgo, and San Luis de Potosí.  Furthermore, as 
indicated by one of our instrumental variables, Mexican immigrants originating from 
communities with a bank in operation before they migrated to the U.S. are 2 percentage points 
more likely to be banked in the U.S.  These results shed light on the important role played by the 
21   availability of a banking infrastructure back home and, hence, immigrants’ familiarity with the 
banking system, in immigrants’ decision to be banked while in the U.S.  Finally, the two sets of 
dummy variables indicative of immigrants’ state of origin as well as of their state of residence in 
the U.S. further demonstrate the importance of other unobserved regional characteristics 
influencing immigrants’ decision to open a bank account during their last U.S. trip.  Overall, the 
probit models for immigrants’ likelihood of being banked during their last U.S. stay are 
identified through: (a) their distinct functional forms (with respect to the Tobit models in Table 3 
and Table 4), and (b) the use of statistically different from zero information on the existence of a 
bank in their communities of origin before migrating to the U.S., as well as on other information 
characteristic of their communities of origin and their U.S. states of residence.   
Mexican Immigrants’ Monthly Remitting Patterns
  Table 3 shows the results from estimating a Tobit model examining the determinants of 
Mexican immigrants’ monthly remittance volume with and without instrumenting for 
immigrants’ bank use while in the U.S.  Note that the coefficients in the Tobit model measure the 
partial effects of changes in our regressors on the expected value of the latent variable ( ).  
However, the variable we wish to understand better is the observed income transfers ( ).  
Therefore, in addition to the estimated coefficient and the standard errors, Table 3 includes 
information on the effect of our independent variables on the probability of remitting on a 
periodic basis, as well as information on the sensitivity of monthly remittances to changes in the 




  Some of the general factors positively linked to immigrants’ periodic remitting patterns 
are worth noting.  For instance, regardless of whether we carry out the analysis with or without 
instrumenting for immigrants’ banking use while in the U.S., male immigrants and immigrants 
22   leaving spouses behind are about 30 and 16 percentage points more likely to remit monthly to 
their families back in Mexico, respectively, than female immigrants and immigrants who do not 
leave their spouses behind.  In particular, male immigrants and immigrants leaving spouses in 
Mexico remit an average of $91-$95 and $57-$58 more on a monthly basis than their female and 
either single or married counterparts migrating jointly with their spouses.  Similarly, immigrants’ 
earnings possibilities in the U.S., as proxied by their ability to speak English and reflected by 
their monthly earnings, also raise their monthly remittances.  Nonetheless, immigrants’ monthly 
earnings do not significantly affect their remittance patterns once we instrument for their banking 
use in the U.S.  Finally, in consonance with the earlier literature on remittances (Kraul 2001), we 
observe lower remittances being sent to family members in urban areas in Mexico (as proxied by 
the number of factories in community of origin), although the magnitude of this effect appears 
economically small.   
  Turning our attention to the effect of banking, Table 5 displays the effect that 
immigrants’ banking and legal status may have on their likelihood to transfer money to their 
families and, in that event, on the amount finally sent home with and without instrumenting for 
immigrants’ banking use during their last U.S. trip (model (1) and model (2), respectively).  
Specifically, the figures in Panel(s) A refer to immigrants’ periodic remittances, whereas those in 
Panel(s) B describe the differential effect of banking and legal status on the amount taken back 
home by immigrants at the end of their migration spells.  These effects are computed using the 
coefficients, as well as the effects of immigrants’ banking and legal status on their probabilities 
of transferring money back home and on the dollar amount finally transferred in Table 3.  
Additionally, Table 5 displays the corresponding joint significance tests.  Overall, the results in 
Table 5 show the lack of statistical significance of Mexican immigrants’ banking and legal status 
23   on their monthly remitting practices, whether we instrument for their banking usage or not.  In 
particular, according to the figures in rows 3 and 4, Panel A, Mexican immigrants with access to 
banking in our sample do not appear to be more likely to remit nor do they seem to remit a 
greater amount than their unbanked counterparts.  In what follows, we examine the possibility 
that access to banking instead results in an increase in the dollar amount saved and brought back 
home by immigrants at the end of their migration spells.     
Lump Sums Brought Back by Mexican Immigrants at the End of their U.S. Migration
  Focusing on a second type of income repatriation, Table 4 displays the results from 
examining the determinants of the level of funds taken back home by Mexican immigrants at the 
end of their migration experiences.  Some of the determinants of the dollar amount brought back 
home by immigrants at the end of their migration spell, whether or not we address the 
endogeneity of their banking status, include their age, whether or not they left a spouse behind 
and the number of factories in their states of origin.  In particular, older Mexican immigrants, 
immigrants who leave their spouse in Mexico, and those coming from relatively more urban 
areas (as captured by the number of factories in the origin) are significantly less likely to bring 
money back home than their younger counterparts, Mexican immigrants who do not leave 
spouses behind, and Mexican immigrants from more rural communities, respectively.  The 
magnitude of these effects on the dollar amount brought back home is relatively large in the case 
of Mexican immigrants who leave spouses behind, who bring back an average of $335 less (or 
$480 if we do not address the endogeneity of their banking status) than those who do not leave 
their spouses in Mexico.  As indicated by the figures in Table 3, return migrants leaving spouses 
behind appear to, instead, remit on a periodic basis.  Additionally, the possibility exists that 
immigrants with spouses left back in Mexico may be more likely to cross back and forth between 
24   Mexico and the U.S. with a greater frequency than those who are single or migrate with their 
spouses to the U.S.  As a result, they may have accumulated less money and, hence, may bring 
less money back home.  Likewise, as in Table 3, return migrants continue to be more likely to 
take money back home when their communities are less industrialized (as captured by the 
number of factories) or more rural.   
  Other determinants of the dollar amount brought back home by Mexican immigrants at 
the end of their migration spells lose their statistical significance as we address the endogeneity 
of immigrants’ banking status while in the U.S.  This is the case with Mexican immigrants’ 
undocumented status as well as with the duration of their last U.S. stay, both of which appear to 
raise the dollar amount brought back home by approximately $183 if undocumented and by $7 
per additional month in the U.S. in the model without IVs.  When we instrument for immigrants’ 
banking use, legal status and duration are not significant in the Tobit model.  This implies that 
their effects on lump sum transfers are solely through their effect on the probability of banking, 
which is captured in the first stage probit. 
  Turning to the impact of banking on immigrants’ likelihood to bring part of their savings 
back home as well as on the dollar amount finally repatriated, the figures in Table 5, panel(s) B 
show the generally robust significance of banking on immigrants’ money transfer practices, 
whether we use an instrumental variable approach or not.  Access to banking increases the lump 
sum brought back home by undocumented (relative to legal) immigrants at the end of their 
migration spells.  According to the figures from model (1), panel B, the undocumented appear to 
bring back home approximately $183 more than their legal counterparts when both are unbanked 
(row 1).  This sum rises to a statistically different from zero sum of $784 when we compare 
banked and undocumented return migrants to banked and legal return migrants (row 2).  The 
25   aforementioned differences between the lump sum transfers of undocumented and legal 
immigrants are further accentuated as we instrument for immigrants’ banking use (model 2, 
panel B, row 2).  In that case, whereas undocumented and legal immigrants do not appear to 
bring back home different sums when unbanked, their money transferring practices significantly 
differ if they are both banked, with the undocumented bringing back home, on average, $4155 
more than their legal counterparts.   
  The importance of access to banking among the undocumented is once more highlighted 
when comparing the lump sums brought back home by banked versus unbanked undocumented 
return migrants (rows 3).  For instance, when we instrument for immigrants’ banking use, 
banked and undocumented immigrants are not only twice as likely to save and take back home 
some of their savings relative to their unbanked counterparts, but also they repatriate an average 
of $6273 more than their unbanked equivalents (model 2, panel B, row 3).  A similar effect is 
found among legal immigrants, who increase their likelihood of bringing money back home at 
the end of their migration spell when banked relative to when they are unbanked by up to 44 
percentage points (model 2, panel B, row 4).  Correspondingly, banked and legal immigrants 
appear to bring back home up to $2182 more than their unbanked and legal counterparts.  In 
sum, while undocumented return migrants with access to banking do not appear to remit more on 
a periodic basis than their unbanked counterparts, they do seem to bring back home a larger 
dollar sum at the end of their migration experiences than unbanked and undocumented return 
migrants.  Hence, the possibility exists that undocumented return migrants with access to 
banking forgo their periodic remittances and, instead, choose to save and bring back a lump sum 
upon their return home.   
 
VIII. Conclusions 
26   The recognition of the ‘matrícula consular’ as an acceptable alien identification by 
financial institutions has been surrounded by substantial debate.  If accepted widely, the 
matrícula may reduce the difficulties of living in the U.S. for undocumented Mexican 
immigrants to a large degree by facilitating access to the U.S. banking system.  Once banked, 
undocumented immigrants may be more likely to save as well as remit part of their savings 
home, whether on a monthly basis through access to the low-cost wiring and money-transfer 
services offered by banks, or as a lump-sum payment taken back home in person upon return to 
Mexico.  The proponents of the card’s acceptance seek to boost the remittances sent home by 
helping immigrants save and by providing them with a safer transmission mechanism.  However, 
the possibility also exists that undocumented immigrants redirect their savings and increase their 
accumulated savings brought back home or to boost their consumption while in the U.S.   
In this paper, we use data on approximately 3,000 migrating household heads interviewed 
upon their return to Mexico from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP).  We choose this sample 
due to the fact that a large share of Mexican immigrants, particularly those who remit, return to 
Mexico, whether temporarily or permanently at some point in their lives (Lowell 1992, 
Lindstrom 1996, Reyes 1997, Orrenius 1999).  Furthermore, the sample design of the MMP is 
such that return migrants interviewed in Mexico are intended to be a representative group of such 
immigrants.  Focusing on this group of Mexican immigrants, we examine the hypothesis that 
access to banking services increases the level of funds sent back home by Mexican immigrants 
while in the U.S.   
We find that despite a steady increase over the past 30 years, bank usage by Mexican 
immigrants during their U.S. stay remains fairly low, particularly among those who return to 
Mexico within a short period of time.  Low banking use by Mexican immigrants may be due to 
27   their undocumented status, low earnings, and/or distrust towards the financial system.  In 
particular, we find that undocumented immigrants are less likely, by almost eight percentage 
points, to be banked than documented Mexican immigrants in our sample.  Therefore, the 
acceptance of the ‘matrícula consular’ by financial institutions may potentially bring in a large 
number of unbanked (the undocumented) into the U.S. banking system and this development 
may have large effects on immigrants’ money repatriating practices. 
Finally, access to banking has very different consequences on the dollar amount remitted 
home on a periodic basis and on the lump sum brought back home at the end of the migration 
spell by immigrants depending on their legal status.  Specifically, while banking use does not 
seem to significantly raise monthly remittance flows regardless of immigration status, it boosts 
undocumented and legal immigrants’ savings and the dollar amount brought back home upon 
their return by over $6000 and $2000, respectively.  That is, immigrants appear to forgo their 
periodic remittances and, instead, significantly increase their savings and the lump sum 
repatriated at the end of their migration spells.   
In sum, the findings suggest that facilitating undocumented immigrants’ access and use 
of the banking system may increase the future flow of funds brought back by immigrants to their 
communities at the end of their migration spells.  Given the potentially important role played by 
remittances in financing productive investments in immigrants’ origin communities, marketing 
and financial literacy efforts targeted at income-repatriating immigrants may result in greater 
comfort with and usage of low-cost financial services in the U.S. and in Latin America.  These 
efforts may prove valuable in fostering economic growth in Mexico. 
28   References  
Aizcorbe, Ana M.; Kennickell, Arthur B.; and Kevin B. Moore. 2003. “Recent Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances” Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, 89(1): 1-32. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Susan Pozo.  “On the Use of Differing Money Transmission 
Methods by Mexican Immigrants” International Migration Review, forthcoming. 
 
Bean, Frank D., Rodolfo Corona, Rodolfo Tuiran, Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield, and Jennifer Van 
Hook.  2001.  “Circular, Invisible, and Ambiguous Immigrants: Components of Differences in 
Estimates of the Number of Unauthorized Mexican Immigrants in the United States” 
Demography, 38, pp. 411-422. 
 
Becker, Gary S.  1981.  A Treatise of the Family, enlarged edition.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Belo, Pedro J.  2001.  Comments at “Remittances as a Development Tool: A Regional 
Conference” Inter-American Development Bank, www.iadb.org/mif/website/static/en/remit.asp
 
Bernheim, B.D. and D.M. Garrett.  1996.  “The Determinants and Consequences of Financial 
Education in the Workplace:  Evidence from a Survey of Households”  NBER Working paper 
#5667, Cambridge, MA:  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Bernheim, B.D., Garrett, D.M. and D.M. Maki. 2001.  “Education and Saving:  The Long-term 
effects of High-School Financial Curriculum Mandates” Journal of Public Economics, 80(3), pp. 
435-465. 
 
Brown, Richard P. C.  1997.  “Estimating Remittance Functions for Pacific Island Migrants.” 
World Development, 25(4), pp. 613-626. 
 
Brown, Richard P.C. and Dennis A. Ahlburg.  1999.  “Remittances in the South Pacific” 
International Journal of the Social Economics, 26, pp. 325-44. 
 
Carroll, C.D. and L.H. Summers. 1987.  “Why have private savings rates in the United States 
and Canada Diverged?”  Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, pp. 249-279. 
 
Caskey, John P.  1994.  Fringe banking: Check-cashing outlets, pawnshops, and the poor.  New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation.   
 
Chiuri, Maria Concetta.  2000.  “Individual Decisions and Household Demand for Consumption 
and Leisure” Research in Economics, 54, pp. 277-324. 
 
Cox Edwards, Alejandra and Manuelita Ureta.  2003.  “Income Transfers and Children’s 
Schooling:  Evidence from El Salvador” Journal of Development Economics, Special Issue, 
72(2), pp. 429-61. 
29   Dinerstein, Marti. 2003.  “IDs for Illegals:  The ‘Matricula Consular’ Advances Mexico’s 
Immigration Agenda” Center for Immigration Studies, Backgrounder. 
 
Durand, Jorge, William Kandel, Emilio A.  Parrado, and Douglas S.  Massey.  1996.  
“International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities” Demography, 33(2), pp.  
249-64.  
 
Gubert, Flore.  2002.  “Do Migrants Insure Those who Stay Behind? Evidence from the Kayes 
Area (Western Mali)” Oxford Development Studies, 30(3), pp. 267-287. 
 
Hall, P. and S. R. Wilson.  1991.  “Two Guidelines for Bootstrap Hypothesis Testing” 
Biometrics 47: 757-762. 
 
Handlin, Elizabeth, Margrethe Krontoft, and William Testa. 2002. “Remittances and the 
Unbanked” Chicago Fed Letter, Number 175a, Special Issue. 
 
Inter American Development Bank. 2002.  “Survey of Remittance Senders: U.S. to Latin 
America” Second Regional Conference on Impact of Remittances as a Development Tool, 
www.iadb.org/mif/website/static/en/remit03.asp. 
 
Kraul, Chris.  2001.  “Latino Immigrants Sending Less Money Home”, Los Angeles Times, 
December 17. 
 
Lindstrom, David P.  1996.  “Economic Opportunity in Mexico and Return Migration from the 
United States,” Demography, 33(3): 357-374. 
 
Lowell, Lindsay B.  1992.  “Circular Mobility, Migrant Communities, and Policy Restrictions: 
Unauthorized Flows from Mexico” in Migration, Population Structure, and Redistribution 
Policies, edited by C. Goldscheider, pp. 137-57.  Boulder: Westview.    
 
Lowell, Lindsay B. and Rodolfo O.  de la Garza.  2002.  “The Development Role of Remittances 
in U.S.  Latino Communities and in Latin American Countries.” In Sending Money Home, edited 
by R. de la Garza and B. L. Lowell, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Oxford, England, pp. 
3-27. 
 
Maddala, G. S.  1992.  Introduction to Econometrics. Macmillan Publishing Company, second 
edition.
 
Malkin, Michelle. 2001.  “Banking on American Stupidity” Capitalism Magazine, December 6. 
 
Massey, Douglas S. and René Zenteno.  2000.  “A Validation of the Ethnosurveys: The Case of 
Mexico-U.S. Migration.”  International Migration Review, 34(3), pp. 766-793. 
 
Middelstadt, Michelle. 2003.  “Use of Matricula as Bank ID Reaffirmed” The Dallas Morning 
News, September 19, 2003. 
 
30   Munshi, Kaivan.  2003.  “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U. S. 
Labor Market” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549-599.
 
Perez, Evan.  2003.  “North Carolina Credit Union Banks on Latino Immigrants” The Wall Street 
Journal, May 9. 
 
Orrenius, Pia M.  1999.  “Return Migration from Mexico: Theory and Evidence.”  Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.   
 
Porter, Eduardo.  2003.  “Banks Can Accept Foreign IDs” The Wall Street Journal, September 
19. 
 
Ravallion, Martin and Lorraine Dearden.  1988.  “Social Security in a ‘Moral Economy’: An 
Empirical Analysis for Java.”  Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(1), pp. 36-44.  
Reyes, Belinda.  1997.  “Dynamics of Immigration: Return Migration to Western Mexico.”  
Public Policy Institute of California.   
 
Schrieder, Gertrud and Beatrice Knerr.  2000.  “Labour Migration as a Social Security 
Mechanism for Smallholder Households in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Cameroon.”  
Oxford Development Studies, 28(2), pp. 223-36. 
 
Seper, Jerry.  2003.  “Mexico Gives IDs to Illegal Aliens” The Washington Times, January 21. 
 
Sherraden, Michael, Mark Schreiner, and Sondra Beverly.  2003.  “Income, Institutions, and 
Saving Performance in Individual Development Accounts” Economic Development Quarterly, 
17(1), pp. 95-112. 
 
Thompson, Ginger.  2003.  “A Surge in Money Sent Home by Mexicans” The New York Times, 
October, 28. 
 
U.S. Treasury.  2003a.  “Fact Sheet:  Final Regulations Implementing Consumer Identity 
Verification Requirements under Section 326 of the U.S.A PATRIOT Act” Office of Public 
Affairs, April 30. 
 
U.S. Treasury.  2003b.  “Fact Sheet:  Results of the Notice of Inquiry on Final Regulations 
Implementing Consumer Identity Verification Requirements under Section 326 of the U.S.A 
PATRIOT Act” Office of Public Affairs, September 18. 
 




31    
Table 1: Trends in the Use of Banking Services by Immigrants 
 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Overall Banked  0.087  0.282 
Decade Last Visited U.S.    
1970s  0.030  0.171 
Younger than 20  0.029  0.170 
20s 0.031  0.173 
30s 0.043  0.203 
40s 0.017  0.130 
50s and older  0.016  0.125 
1980s  0.085  0.279 
Younger than 20  0.085  0.280 
20s 0.110  0.313 
30s 0.068  0.252 
40s 0.075  0.264 
50s and older  0.079  0.271 
1990s  0.099  0.298 
Younger than 20  0.181  0.387 
20s 0.083  0.277 
30s 0.106  0.308 
40s 0.114  0.318 
50s and older  0.078 0.268 
2000-2002  0.190  0.395 
Younger than 20  0.500  0.577 
20s 0.135  0.347 
30s 0.200  0.406 
40s 0.263  0.452 
50s and older  0.100  0.316 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations using the MMP93. 
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Table 2: Remittances and Lump Sum Transfers of Migrants by Banking Status  
 
Unconditional  Conditional on Remitting 
(Remittances > 0) 
Migrant Characteristics 
Mean Diff. t-stat Mean Diff. t-stat 
All Migrants        
Remittances        
Unbanked  189.18     244.96    
Banked 205.93  -16.75  -1.01 329.05  -84.10  -3.88*** 
Savings Returned to Mexico        
Unbanked 922.92     1265.09    
Banked 3326.17  -2403.25  -4.33*** 4434.90 -3169.81  -4.37*** 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations using the MMP93. 
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Table 3: Tobit Model for the Dollar Amount Remitted Monthly 
 
  Model (1) – Without IVs   Model (2) – With IVs 

























Dollar Amount Remitted Monthly 
Banked   -15.0392  29.0363  -0.0180  -7.2230  -33.3002  111.6647  -0.0394  -16.0986 
Undocumented   7.6270               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
     
15.7862 0.0090 3.6953 -3.6739 20.0669 -0.0043 -1.7783
Banked*Undocumented  39.1699 45.8645 0.0448 19.6908 113.7300 170.6503 0.1347 54.9815
Male  226.6835*** 32.5625 0.2931 90.8198 239.8663*** 31.5660 0.3096 94.6726
Age  0.6862 0.6236 0.0008 0.3333 0.6718 0.5902 0.0008 0.3248
Years of Education  -3.0785 1.8973 -0.0036 -1.4954 -3.0450 2.0461 -0.0036 -1.4721
Speaks English  39.8921*** 16.2696 0.0462 19.7943 35.7750** 20.5060 0.0416 17.6261
Monthly Earnings in the U.S.  0.0065*** 0.0024 7.72E-06 0.0032 0.0063 0.0135 7.50E-06 0.0031
Duration of Last Trip  -0.4979 0.3165 -0.0006 -0.2419 -0.6765 0.4172 -0.0008 -0.3271
Duration of Last Trip Squared  0.0009 0.0010 1.03E-06 0.0004 0.0015 0.0012 1.73E-06 0.0007
Left Spouse in Mexico  125.7371*** 17.3580 0.1564 56.7962 129.5341*** 20.1643 0.1612 58.1516
Dependents in Mexico  17.7037 29.1212 0.0209 8.6000 13.0053 33.7458 0.0154 6.2873
Number of Factories in Origin  -0.0058** 0.0029 -6.84E-06 -0.0028 -0.0108*** 0.0040 -1.28E-05 -0.0052
Lowest Living Standard in Origin  -18.7175 35.9094 -0.0224 -8.9440 -23.4817 29.9195 -0.0283 -11.1178
Second Lowest Living Standard in Origin   -15.6928 18.2902 -0.0187 -7.5411 -20.9516 17.1536 -0.0251 -9.9783
Regression Fit Statistics 
Number of Observations  2564  2456 
(Left) Censored Observations  617  596 
LR Chi2 (15)  138.29  150.74 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood  -14369.664  -13732.624 
Notes:  We refer to the ‘conditional’ expectation as the expectation conditional on both remitting back home and other regressors.  *** Signifies statistically different 
from zero at the 1 percent level or better, ** at the 5 percent level or better and * at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant.   
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  Model (1) – Without IVs   Model (2) – With IVs 
























Dollar Amount Saved and Brought Back Home 
Banked   1981.3960***  505.3575  0.1498  825.1785       
             
             
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
           
           
               
               
               
     
5791.6580***
 
2566.2030 0.4405 2182.2345 
Undocumented   488.4433** 280.9063 0.0381 183.1094 172.0029 439.7930 0.0131 64.5837
Banked*Undocumented  1463.1240** 814.8925 0.1115 600.9346 10855.7200 6762.6220 0.8257 4090.3205 
Male  591.9933 555.0876 0.0462 217.3235 487.3718 821.3026 0.0371 179.0862
Age  -19.8228* 11.2109 -0.0015 -7.5081 -24.0421*** 10.7968 -0.0018 -9.0588
Years of Education  -26.1260 33.0352 -0.0020 -9.8955 -41.1662 36.2030 -0.0031 -15.5110
Speaks English  425.8004 288.4444 0.0331 163.5912 -370.6014 522.2471 -0.0282 -137.9773
Monthly Earnings in the U.S.  0.0507 0.0422 3.94E-06 0.0192 -0.0141 0.1572 -1.08E-06 -0.0053
Duration of Last Trip  19.2070*** 5.3840 0.0015 7.2749 -0.1223 7.7056 -9.30E-06 -0.0461
Duration of Last Trip Squared  -0.0471*** 0.0158 -3.66E-06 -0.0178 -0.0181 0.0245 -1.38E-06 -0.0068
Left Spouse in Mexico  -1211.7860***
 
  302.6418 -0.0934 -480.2420 -861.0167***
 
  405.3844 -0.0651 -334.6875
Dependents in Mexico  160.3699 513.0315 0.0125 60.7419 -56.5095 444.0580 -0.0043 -21.2922
Number of Factories in Origin  -0.1213** 0.0532 -9.45E-06 -0.0460 -0.1882*** 0.0758 -1.43E-05 -0.0709
Lowest Living Standard in Origin  264.9862 619.1772 0.0206 101.8345 237.7735 276.3684 0.0181 90.7487
Second Lowest Living Standard in Origin   -12.6727 320.4140 -0.0010 -4.7973 206.3862 296.0775 0.0157 78.4629
Regression Fit Statistics 
Number of Observations  2390  2283 
(Left) Censored Observations  544  534 
LR Chi2 (15)  126.42  126.71 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood  -18772.982  -17840.322 
 Notes:  We refer to the ‘conditional’ expectation as the expectation conditional on both remitting back home and other regressors.  *** Signifies statistically different 
from zero at the 1 percent level or better, ** at the 5 percent level or better and * at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant.     
35   Table 5: The Effects of Being Banked by Legal Status without IVs 
(Note:   )  ε φ β β β + + + + =
'
3 2 1 X ed Undocument * Banked ed Undocument Banked T
Group    Computation Coefficient  Joint Significance 
(Chi-square 
Statistic) 
Partial Effect on 
the Probability of 
Being Uncensored 
Partial Effect on 
the Conditional 
Expectation 
Model (1) – Without IVs 
Panel A – Effects of Being Banked on the Dollar Amount Remitted Monthly by Migrant Legal Status 
1 Unbanked: Undocumented vs. Legal  β2 7.6270        0.23 0.0090 3.6953
2 Banked: Undocumented vs. Legal  (β2+β3)         
         
       
46.7969 0.67 0.0538 23.3861
3 Undocumented: Banked vs. Unbanked   (β1+β3) 24.1307 0.36 0.0268 12.4678
4 Legal: Banked vs. Unbanked  β1 -15.0392 0.27 -0.0180 -7.2230
Panel B – Effects of Being Banked on the Dollar Amount Saved and Brought Back Home by Migrant Legal Status 
1 Unbanked: Undocumented vs. Legal  β2 488.4433*        3.02 0.0381 183.1094
2 Banked: Undocumented vs. Legal  (β2+β3)         
         
       
1951.5673*** 4.51 0.1496 784.0440
3 Undocumented: Banked vs. Unbanked   (β1+β3) 3444.5200*** 19.45 0.2613 1426.1131
4 Legal: Banked vs. Unbanked  β1 1981.3960*** 15.37 0.1498 825.1785
Model (2) – With IVs 
Panel A – Effects of Being Banked on the Dollar Amount Remitted Monthly by Migrant Legal Status 
1 Unbanked: Undocumented vs. Legal  β2 -3.6739        0.03 -0.0044 -1.7783
2 Banked: Undocumented vs. Legal  (β2+β3)         
         
       
110.0561 0.45 0.1304 53.2032
3 Undocumented: Banked vs. Unbanked   (β1+β3) 80.4297 0.46 0.0953 38.8829
4 Legal: Banked vs. Unbanked  β1 -33.3002 0.12 -0.0394 -16.0986
Panel B – Effects of Being Banked on the Dollar Amount Saved and Brought Back Home by Migrant Legal Status 
1 Unbanked: Undocumented vs. Legal  β2 172.0029        0.23 0.0131 64.5837
2 Banked: Undocumented vs. Legal  (β2+β3)         
         
       
11027.7279*** 16.77 0.8388 4154.9042
3 Undocumented: Banked vs. Unbanked   (β1+β3) 16647.3829*** 18.79 1.2662 6272.5550
4 Legal: Banked vs. Unbanked  β1 5791.6579*** 11.15 0.4405 2182.2345
Notes:  We refer to the ‘conditional’ expectation as the expectation conditional on both remitting back home and other regressors.  *** Signifies statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, ** at the 5 percent level or better and * at the 10 percent level or better. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variables Definition  Mean  S.D.
 
Dependent variables:       
Likelihood of Remitting on a Monthly Basis  Likelihood of remitting money to Mexico on a 
monthly basis during their last U.S. trip  0.7605  0.4269 
Dollar Amount Remitted Monthly  The real dollar amount remitted on a monthly basis 
to Mexico during their last U.S. trip (includes non-
remitters)  190.4298 242.4522 
Likelihood of Saving and Bringing Money 
Back Home  
Likelihood of saving and brining money to Mexico 
at the end of their last U.S. trip  0.7294 0.4444 
Dollar Amount Saved and Brought Back 
Home 
The real dollar amount saved and brought back to 
Mexico at the end of their last U.S. trip (includes 
those who do not bring back savings)  1128.527 4027.409 
Independent variables:       
Banked  Dummy equal to 1 if migrant had a bank account 
during the last U.S. trip  0.0872 0.2822 
Undocumented   Dummy equal to 1 if migrant lacked proper 
documentation at time of last entry  0.6762  0.4680 
Male Gender  dummy  0.9466 0.2248 
Age  Age at time of last migration to the U.S.   35.0545 12.4591 
Years of Education  Years of educational attainment  5.2800 3.9271 
Speaks English  Dummy equal to 1 if migrant spoke English during 
last U.S. trip  0.2448  0.4300 
Monthly Earnings in the U.S.  Monthly earnings during their last U.S. trip in real 
dollars (adjusted for inflation using CPI-U(82-84))  895.3924 2288.572 
Duration of Last Trip to the U.S.  Duration of last U.S. trip in months  25.4508 54.4556 
Left Spouse in Mexico  Dummy variable for leaving a spouse in Mexico   0.8391 0.3675 
Dependents in Mexico  Percent of HH members of non-working age back in 
Mexico  0.6494 0.2165 
Number of Factories in Origin  Number of factories in migrant’s origin community  466.2246 2121.224 
Lowest Standard of Living in Origin  Standard of Living dummy created using the 
classification presented by INEGI at 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espa
nol/niveles/   
The lowest level includes the states of: Guerrero and 
Oaxaca. 0.0394  0.1945 
Second Lowest Standard of Living in Origin  Standard of Living dummy for the states of: 
Hidalgo, Puebla, and San Luis de Potosí  0.1353 0.3421 
Third (Middle) Standard of Living in Origin  Standard of Living dummy for the states of: 
Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Zacatecas  0.4371  0.4961 
Fourth Level of Standard of Living in Origin  Standard of Living dummy for the states of: Colima, 
Durango, Jalisco, Nayarit, and Sinaloa  0.2581  0.4376 
Fifth Level of Standard of Living in Origin  Standard of Living dummy for the states of: 
Aguascalientes, Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, 
and Nuevo León.  0.1301  0.3365 
Bank in Origin Before Migration  Dummy equal to 1 if there was a bank in the 
community of origin before migrating to the U.S.  0.6930 0.4613 
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Variables Definition  Mean  S.D.
 
Aguascalientes   Mexican State dummy  0.0280  0.1649 
Baja California del Norte  Mexican State dummy  0.0362 0.1867 
Colima  Mexican State dummy  0.0277 0.1641 
Chihuahua  Mexican State dummy  0.0516 0.2211 
Durango  Mexican State dummy  0.0531 0.2242 
Guanajuato  Mexican State dummy  0.1736 0.3788 
Guerrero  Mexican State dummy  0.0210 0.1435 
Hidalgo  Mexican State dummy  0.0149 0.1211 
Jalisco  Mexican State dummy  0.1280 0.3341 
Michoacán  Mexican State dummy  0.1159 0.3202 
Nayarit  Mexican State dummy  0.0313 0.1741 
Nuevo León  Mexican State dummy  0.0149 0.1211 
Oaxaca  Mexican State dummy  0.0190 0.1365 
Puebla  Mexican State dummy  0.0215 0.14528 
San Luis Potosi  Mexican State dummy  0.1016 0.3021 
Sinaloa  Mexican State dummy  0.0182 0.1337 
Zacatecas   Mexican State dummy  0.1436 0.3508 
Arizona  U.S. state dummy  0.0216 0.1455 
Arkansas  U.S. state dummy  0.0010 0.0321 
California  U.S. state dummy  0.5389 0.4986 
Colorado  U.S. state dummy  0.0134 0.1149 
Connecticut  U.S. state dummy  0.0003 0.0160 
Delaware  U.S. state dummy  0.0003 0.0160 
District of Columbia  U.S. state dummy  0.0018 0.04242 
Florida  U.S. state dummy  0.0273 0.1626 
Georgia  U.S. state dummy  0.0111 0.1046 
Idaho  U.S. state dummy  0.0180 0.1331 
Illinois  U.S. state dummy  0.0690 0.2539 
Indiana  U.S. state dummy  0.0026 0.0507 
Iowa  U.S. state dummy  0.0003 0.0160 
Kansas  U.S. state dummy  0.0093 0.0958 
Kentucky  U.S. state dummy  0.0013 0.0359 
Louisiana  U.S. state dummy  0.0006 0.0227 
Maryland  U.S. state dummy  0.0005 0.0227 
Massachusetts  U.S. state dummy  0.0005 0.0227 
Michigan  U.S. state dummy  0.0028 0.0531 
Minnesota  U.S. state dummy  0.0008 0.0278 
Mississippi  U.S. state dummy  0.0002 0.0160 
Missouri  U.S. state dummy  0.0023 0.0481 
Nebraska  U.S. state dummy  0.0015 0.0393 
Nevada  U.S. state dummy  0.0175 0.1312 
New Jersey  U.S. state dummy  0.0023 0.0481 
New Mexico  U.S. state dummy  0.0090 0.0945 
New York  U.S. state dummy  0.0170 0.1293 
North Carolina  U.S. state dummy  0.0103 0.1010 
Ohio  U.S. state dummy  0.0015 0.0393 
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Variables Definition  Mean  S.D.
 
Oklahoma  U.S. state dummy  0.0100  0.0997 
Oregon  U.S. state dummy  0.0100 0.0997 
Pennsylvania  U.S. state dummy  0.0126 0.1116 
South Carolina  U.S. state dummy  0.0039 0.0620 
Tennessee  U.S. state dummy  0.0021 0.0453 
Texas  U.S. state dummy  0.1601 0.3668 
Utah  U.S. state dummy  0.0036 0.0599 
Virginia  U.S. state dummy  0.0018 0.0424 
Washington  U.S. state dummy  0.0090 0.0945 
Wisconsin  U.S. state dummy  0.0010 0.0321 
Puerto Rico  U.S. state dummy  0.0005 0.0227 
US, state unknown  U.S. state dummy  0.0023  0.0481 
Source: Mexican Migration Project (MMP93).     
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Variables Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal  Effect 
Undocumented -0.6101***  0.0927  -0.0758 
Male  0.1521 0.2020  0.0140 
Age  0.0013 0.0039  0.0001 
Years of Education  0.0123 0.0117  0.0013 
Speaks English  0.6215*** 0.0893 0.0857 
Monthly Earnings in the U.S.  2.72E-05*** 1.11E-05 2.79E-06 
Duration of Last Trip  0.0117*** 0.0014 0.0012 
Duration of Last Trip Squared  -1.68E-05*** 3.79E-06 -1.73E-06 
Left Spouse in Mexico  -0.2684*** 0.0951 -0.0316 
Dependents in Mexico  0.1376 0.1865  0.0141 
Number of Factories in Origin  3.69E-05 2.62E-05  3.79E-06 
Lowest Level Standard of Living in Origin  -0.1666 0.3129  -0.0150 
Second Lowest Level Standard of Living in Origin  -0.3261** 0.1738  -0.0273 
Bank in Origin Before Migration  0.1876*  0.1272  0.0178 
Aguascalientes  -0.3304 0.3527  -0.0262 
Baja California del Norte -0.2682* 0.1911  -0.0225 
Colima -0.3694* 0.2647  -0.0285 
Chihuahua -0.8486** 0.3804  -0.0458 
Durango -0.7857*** 0.3008 -0.0450 
Guanajuato -0.3992*** 0.1588 -0.0325 
Jalisco -0.0722 0.1486  -0.0071 
Michoacán 0.0600 0.1440  0.0064 
Nayarit  0.0711 0.2176  0.0077 
Nuevo León -0.9009** 0.4747  -0.0451 
Puebla -0.3666 0.9505  -0.0278 
Sinaloa 0.1814 0.2856  0.0214 
Arizona  -0.4160 0.4050  -0.0306 
Colorado  0.1555 0.3871  0.0180 
Florida  -0.8126*** 0.3256 -0.0446 
Georgia  -0.0287 0.6077  -0.0029 
Idaho  -0.0601 0.2332  -0.0059 
Illinois  0.2560* 0.1661  0.0314 
Indiana  0.3893 1.0711  0.0543 
Kansas  1.0525*** 0.4364 0.2238 
Michigan  0.6255 0.7390  0.1035 
Missouri  0.4537 0.8351  0.0664 
Nebraska  1.3339** 0.6967  0.3264 
Nevada  -0.3320 0.3260  -0.0261 
New Jersey  1.0766** 0.6570  0.2338 
North Carolina  -0.1583 0.4223  -0.0143 
Ohio  0.9707* 0.6196  0.1990 
Oklahoma  0.3775 0.4845  0.0520 
Oregon  -0.0276 0.3972  -0.0028 
South Carolina  0.3672 0.4880  0.0503 
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Variables Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal  Effect 
Texas -0.1719  0.1550  -0.0160 
Virginia  0.8910 0.7624  0.1746 
Washington  -0.2887 0.4724  -0.0234 
Wisconsin  1.4812** 0.8126  0.3836 
Regression Fit Statistics   
Number of Observations  2624 
LR Chi2 (48)  481.09 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 
Log Likelihood  -598.3209 
Percent Banked  0.1380 
Predicted Probability of Being Banked  0.1426 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically 
different from zero at the 5 percent level or better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
level or better.  The regressions include a constant.  The reference categories for the standard of living dummies 
are Mexican states with standards of livings included in the third, fourth or fifth category of living standards as 
specified in Table A.  The reference categories for the state of interview in Mexico is Zacatecas and for the U.S. 
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